manipulates this archival film, but does not supplement it with talking heads, photographs, or other material. Its goal is not authenticity, with the suspect overtones of unquestionable authority that claims to authenticity evoke. Rather, the film aims at what the filmmakers call a "desacralized, lay treatment"5 of the Eichmann case, the case with which, according to Israeli historian Tom Segev, "Israel began to design its collective memory of the Holocaust"6 and with which, according to Peter Novick, "the Holocaust was presented to the American public as an entity in its own right" for the first time.7 Aware of the centrality of the trial for understanding the Holocaust, the filmmakers seek pointedly to oppose the "moralizing and sermonizing attitude" that would "transform suffering into redemption" ("SR"). Indeed, their film contrasts sharply with the sermonizing that characterized, for example, the 1997 ABC-PBS documentary The Trial of Adolf Eichmann and its accompanying instructional website, which hew closely to the Israeli prosecution's case with its associated public political goals.8 Seeking to avoid putting themselves on "a pedagogic track," Sivan and Brauman supply no voice-over commentary that would inform viewers about the events of World War II and the Holocaust. "In return," Brauman says, "the philosophical or political questions that arise from the mass of events and the horrors thus evoked strike viewers because they refer to actual interrogations or experiences" ("SR").
Several distinctive aspects of The Specialist justify Sivan and Brauman's hopes for its liberating effect on the public perception of the Eichmann case. It shifts the focus of attention away from the victims, where so much Holocaust narrative directs it, to the perpetrator in the dock. The perpetrator, moreover, is seen to lack literary, diabolical qualities that might otherwise make a sadistic narrative emotionally thrilling. The victims whose testimony does appear were not uniformly without agency, as in the case of the controversial Hungarian Jewish Council member, Pinchas Freudiger, whose appearance unleashes a courtroom outburst.9 The testimony, rather than invoking an intimate, confessional immediacy, is always seen in its legal, institutional context. Without this context, the public constraints to which even the most private testimony conforms become conveniently invisible.10 Indeed, the trial footage in the film highlights the fact that a trial is a process and a ritual-social, historical, and bureaucratic. We see in the course of the film how law, morality, and force are ambiguously intertwined, even in a case that is often taken as a decisive frame of reference for grounding legal judgments of good and evil. By foregrounding the legal mise-en-scene of 1961 as an event with an interpretive and political dynamic distinct from, although thickly related to, the events of the Nazi murders, the film makes its most pointed contribution to representing the Holocaust as an occurrence that like all occurrences is presentable only in its subsequent stagings. The film is a representation of a representation. Its images of the Israeli courtroom's particular contingencies, as well as its own cinematic contingencies, help a viewer question whether the Holocaust can serve as a last word-whether it, as an event apparently beyond our horizon of daily ambiguity and debate, can supply the final vocabulary for instituting and assessing morality and justice."I In its desire to provoke a contemplative rather than an identificatory mindset, Sivan and Brauman's aim is much like Primo Levi's in writing Survival in Auschwitz "to furnish documentation for a quiet study of certain aspects of the human mind."12 Accordingly, the immediacy of the docu- My problem is that language already historicizes the private sphere such that appeals to the moral immanence of the private are always questionable. Certainly personal considerations can override criminal considerations in different institutional contexts, but I do not believe it is a primarily privative quality that defines those contexts.
11. In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge, 1989), Richard Rorty describes a "final vocabulary" as those terms of our personal doctrine that we cannot justify except with reference to themselves (p. 73). John Rawls makes the point that there can be no purely procedural justice, arguing that the procedural arrangements of justice need substantive checks. The Eichmann case complicates the picture of such personal final vocabularies as moral checks on procedures or institutions because it demonstrates how conventional our most absolute intuitions can be. Our fixed points and final vocabularies are likewise subject to the contingency of the political.
Political authority is not mysterious, nor is it to be sanctified by symbols and rituals citizens
12. Primo Levi, Survival in Auschwitz: The Nazi Assault on Humanity (New York, 1993), p. 9.
mented interrogations and testimonies is not presented as exclusive of the retrospective construction involved in deliberation. Using Brechtian effects such as an eerie, quasi-industrial soundtrack, film tinting, and digital manipulations of light, space, and motion, Sivan and Brauman remind viewers that the film, as uncommented as it is, is indeed an artful condensation of a four-month trial. This condensation of over 350 hours of footage, moreover, does not pose as a transparent abridgment, but is guided by and supports the theses of Arendt's controversial 1963 book Eichmann in Jerusalem.13 Returning viewers to the sights and sounds of the proceedings on which Arendt reported, the film also uses her report as its interpretive framework. We see and hear testimony that takes the rough oral form of unprepared sworn statement, but still must follow the court's rules of order; the filmmakers dwell on unexpected moments where the prosecution or judges irritably call for the visibly upset defendant or a witness to properly heed a question. 16. Although LaCapra marks his differences from, among others, Felman and Langer and their "hyperbolic appeal to a 'thematic' of the traumatic and the sublime," his central vocabulary for discussing the representation of Nazi crimes is, like theirs, drawn from the literature of trauma (Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma [Baltimore, 2001], p. 93 n. 6). Memory and its unintentional processes are more important to his work than the institutional arrangements and normative judgments that concern both Arendt and Sivan and Brauman. LaCapra's considerations are ecumenical to the point that I would suggest he is not delineating a methodology so much as calling for sensitivity to methodological complementarity. His topoi, for example, the "negative sublime" of Himmler's 1943 Posen speech, can be differentiated from the topoi of moral and political judgment and the constrained choices they imply. See LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma (Ithaca, N.Y., 1994), pp. 105-10, History and Memory after Auschwitz (Ithaca, N.Y., 1998), pp. 27-29, and Writing History, Writing Trauma, p. 93. A political focus would obviate the need for understatements such as this: "But just as history should not be conflated with testimony, so agency should not simply be conflated with, or limited to, witnessing. In order to change a state of affairs in a desirable manner, effective agency may have to go beyond witnessing to take up more comprehensive modes of political and social practice" (LaCapra, History and Memory after Auschwitz, p. 12). In this sense, LaCapra's concerns are apolitical despite a methodological largesse that urges familiarity with political implications. Here I would also like to mention Novick's healthy skepticism about whether the Holocaust, as an objective set of events, actually constitutes sufficient grounds for separate theories of representation.
of an institutional process, and we understand them as both preceding and following their social interpretation. The filmmakers avoid creating effects of awe and sublimity because they do not want so much to rupture the situation of the Holocaust in human affairs that stretch from fascism to cold war to ethnic conflict as to ask viewers to consider what that continuum might help us to see about ourselves.17 Just as the bluntness of Arendt's report raised accusations that she was insensitive to the collective trauma caused by Nazi crimes, so too it might fairly be averred that The Specialist takes no particular consideration of psychoanalytic categories, opting to let the forensic setting stand without therapeutic interventions by the filmmakers. The fallible and malleable courtroom setting, the controversial Arendt report, and the edited and modified film stock all work toward a less cathartic and more speculative, though not didactic, approach to what the filmmakers see as the quintessence of the Eichmann phenomenon-the easily effaced borderline between legitimate claims of power and the unjust violence of law, state, or individual.
I want to engage questions such as these in order to extend the film's project of discharging the aura that makes discussion of the Holocaust both so seductive and so proprietary, so symbolically transcendent and so institutionally specific. In order to do this, I want to set out in more detail the film's interpretive perspective as well as indicate some limitations of its formal re-visioning of received Holocaust tropes. The bulk of this essay will take up the film's interpretive questions about the meaning of crime, justice, and the state and develop them not only in ways that the film itself does. The goal here is to accept the film's challenge of reconsidering the Eichmann trial today, decades after its precedents for discussing the events referred to under the rubric of the Holocaust have become dominant norms for the historiography of morals. What kind of moment was the Eichmann trial in the history of moral thought and legal institutions? The Specialist's disciplined aesthetic allows us to pursue that question with a freshness that the importance of the trial for subsequent developments in the terms of sovereignty and international justice certainly justifies. After considering what the Eichmann trial has suggested about psychological, ethical, and institutional bases for establishing international law, I will consider political responses-particularly cold war responses-to the trial's consolidation of the international public significance of the Holocaust. For, perhaps more important than setting a general, codifiable legal precedent, the trial con-densed a self-evident political meaning for the Holocaust, available to those who exercise jurisdiction over it. At the end of the essay, I return to the starting point, Sivan and Brauman's film, and, more specifically, the aesthetic questions The Specialist poses about cinematic and literary testimony as a form for exemplifying moral judgment and political choice. I will argue that to the extent the film aestheticizes the process of evidence and adjudication-distancing it, framing it (in an echo of Heidegger's revealing technological Ge-stellb-it implies a notion of autonomous judgment that, while it throws into relief both the trial's politicization and moralization, suggests a nonpolitical model of justice based on perceptive intuition acterize with respect to language, office, and social standing the personality that Eichmann reveals over the course of 121 trial sessions. She analyzes, in other words, his testimony as a realistic thought process, considering Eichmann in terms similar to those in which she once considered the assimilated nineteenth-century German-Jewish writer Rahel Varnhagen, as a social parvenu struggling against the fear of falling back into the low status of a pariah.19 She situates Eichmann in a biographical and social world, a realistic world of both inclination and duty distinct from the categorical world of moral duty alone. Thus characterizing Eichmann as a socially situated self, rather than an abstract universal citizen, she is able to examine the distance between this realistic-and unremarkable-moral psychology and the spirit of practical reason that underlay Kant's notion of morality.20 In this worldly empirical respect, Arendt's concern is above all with language, which as communication allows collective moral engagement and as slogans-or "statutes and formulas," as Kant called them-21 cover for individual moral disengagement. In a world where our actions and identity are coeval with the language we speak-and this conversational world is where Arendt locates the vita activa that makes politics possible-we can hardly be expected realistically to escape the rules and formulas that speak us as much as we speak them.
Whatever men do or know or experience can make sense only to the extent that it can be spoken about. There may be truths beyond speech, and they may be of great relevance to man in the singular, that is, to man in so far as he is not a political being, whatever else he may be. Men in the plural, that is, men in so far as they live and move and act in this world, can experience meaningfulness only because they can talk with and make sense to each other and to themselves.22 That Eichmann does not at all escape the cliched language of Nazi bureaucracy, however, means that he falls short of the specifically political demands of the vita activa. 25. Schmitt rejects the negative definition of the political in opposition to the legal. He defines the political positively: "The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy." He goes on to say that the friend-enemy grouping is "always the decisive human grouping, the political entity. If such an entity exists at all, it is always the decisive entity, and it is sovereign." He then draws the legal conclusion from this that "to the state as an essentially political entity belongs the jus belli, that is, the real possibility of deciding in a concrete situation upon the enemy and the ability to fight him with the power emanating from the entity." This jus belli, according to Schmitt, gives the state a dual possibility: to demand its members to die and to kill its enemies. From these possibilities stem the third possibility of law: "The endeavor of a normal state consists above all in assuring total peace within the state and its territory. To create tranquility, security, and order and thereby establish the normal situation is the prerequisite for legal norms to be valid. Every norm presupposes a normal situation, and no norm can be valid in an entirely abnormal situation" ( That she believes justice to be a real possibility in the face both of Eichmann's incommensurable actions and the Israeli state's desire for authority is made clear by her invocation of justice's austere and politically withdrawn personal ethics as the anchor of her critical standpoint. "Justice," she writes, still taking Landau as her model, "demands seclusion, it permits sorrow rather than anger, and it prescribes the most careful abstention from all the nice pleasures of putting oneself in the limelight" (El, p. 6). For Arendt, justice, unlike politics, does not speak a language of persuasion and communication, but of analysis. It is a technical language, expressed in logical rules of inference and evidence, and its stringent procedures require self-effacement. Political language, by contrast, is one of negotiation, influence, affect, and public recognition.
Yet this faith in the possibility of justice, at least liberal Kantian deontic justice, in the prosecution of Eichmann is steadily undermined by the progress of her own report. First, the empirical moral psychology of Eichmann that we have discussed gives ever greater evidence of the impossibility of basing interpersonal legal norms on the autonomous responsibility of the individual. In fact, in the second chapter, Arendt demonstrates in comical detail how Eichmann not only obeyed orders (the infamous Nuremberg defense) but also obeyed the law in both letter and spirit. Eichmann convincingly argued that his subjective intent-and according to Kant, intent, not consequence, is the test of moral integrity-27 was not criminal but legally exemplary. of your actions were the same as that of the legislator or of the law of the land" rather than that of universal law (EJ, pp. 137, 136). As her account reaches the eighth chapter, "Duties of a Law-Abiding Citizen," it becomes harder and harder to believe that any but the little man's imperative is a sound practical basis for jurisprudence, at least for an international jurisprudence that includes the full range of modern state forms.28 Arendt recognizes that in most modern states Unmundigkeit (legal immaturity) is anything but selbstverschuldet (one's own fault), as Kant believed it was once mankind embarked upon the path of enlightenment.29 A sovereign state might promote individual autonomy, but should that benevolent civil condition not obtain, and it seldom, if ever, does, a citizenry has not the remotest empirical possibility-at least not without a countervailing organizational force-of attaining full ethical independence from state power.
It is a common and reassuring misreading of Arendt to see her account of Eichmann's obedience as also one of his culpability. In this reading, his guilt is due to his letting the state ("the law of the land") take precedence over reason ("universal law"); thus, when the state became criminal, so nolens volens did Eichmann. In this reading, Arendt's text would seem a rather Communists and Socialists-had been destroyed, there was little room left for any morally uncompromised behavior other than Kant's proverbial resignation of one's post, that is, complete abandonment of the political. While Arendt did believe that the category of guilt must be applied to actors in the Nazi state and that Eichmann, for one, was guilty and deserved to die, the judgment she finally speaks in the book's epilogue is fatalistically empirical: "Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that it was nothing more than misfortune that made you [Eichmann] a willing instrument in the organization of mass murder; there still remains the fact that you have carried out, and therefore actively supported, a policy of mass murder" (EJ, p. 279).
The wide berth that she leaves to accident or fate in her judgment is depressing indeed, for then it seems the response to genocide must always be ex post facto unless, that is, we can read her fatalism as something that might be better understood by institutional-juridical (that is, ultimately, political) rather than moral-juridical (natural law) categories. Here we see, then, how the tension between politics and justice comes to the fore in the other focus of the book, the institutionalization of law in the state; for justice, if it cannot safely be entrusted to the moral intuition of the individual, must be institutionalized in the communal life of the state. The question is, as the discussion of the Schmittian conception of justice indicates, what kind of state? The implication of fate in Arendt's judgment of Eichmann seems to be that an individual must take responsibility not only for his or her individual actions, but, more fundamentally, for the state in which his or her individuality will either thrive in justice or wilt in moral dependency. Thus, Jirgen Habermas believes that only a liberal democratic state can legitimize justice, whereas for Schmitt or even a Left-leaning philosopher such as Richard Rorty a state inevitably must be ethnocentric, the relevant question for justice only being how broadly or narrowly so.31 To ignore the state and its capacity to institutionalize positive justice is to turn humanity over to the very fate that recklessly mishandled both Eichmann and the millions whose murder he abetted. One is left only with a dull lesson in the ineradicable evil of mankind. Arendt herself fears this as the chief legacy of the Eichmann trial-a fear that is not allayed by subsequent developments either in discussions of the Holocaust or in the attempts to criminalize gen- The state, through the dictatorial formation of legislative will, can precede justice for the worse by preempting liberal criteria of guilt, as we see in Arendt's analysis of totalitarianism. The state can also enable justice for the better, as we see in her regret over the missed judicial/legislative opportunity of the Eichmann trial. What this dependent justice finally is does not concern Arendt. Her report on the trial, as she states in the postscript she wrote in the aftermath of the bitter controversy that the book generated in the early 196os, does not aim at a speculative theory of justice, but at a detailed description of a trial and its immediate implications. Yet, importantly, it was one of the book's chief merits that it did generate controversy about the political conditions of justice in, at least, this one very important instance. Because Arendt did not settle the case's questions with absolute versions of justice or politics, moral philosophy or democratic institutional theory, she was also not ready to draw vast Holocaust "lessons." She pointed, rather, to the ambiguities that such an extreme (and supranational) crime coupled with such an ordinary (and patriotic) criminal raise for the foundations of contemporary political identities.
Between States and Citizens: Eichmann in the Cold War and Beyond
Because it was the ordinariness of Eichmann that most haunted or threatened Arendt's commentators, it is worth looking at our own legal and political normalcy today in light of developments since the Eichmann trial. In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt claims that France, the first modern nation-state, already embodied the tension between the institutionalization of universal laws and the cohesive idea of national sovereignty:
The same essential rights were at once claimed as the inalienable heritage of all human beings and as the specific heritage of specific nations, the same nation was at once declared to be subject to laws, which supposedly would flow from the Rights of Man, and sovereign, that is, bound by no universal law and acknowledging nothing superior to itself.32
With this characteristic tension of nation-states still far from being superseded in a globalizing world-and with its geopolitical exacerbation through Israel's military measures against Palestinian sovereign aspirations-the link between the Eichmann precedent and subsequent calls for selected war criminals to face even the sort of international tribunals that Arendt hoped for in the Eichmann case suggests the ease with which international law turns into its opposite. Without norms or mechanisms guaranteeing equal protection, these tribunals readily serve the interests of sovereignty instead of consistently applying standards of universal rights. In this sense, it is revealing to step back from seeing Israel as a constituted jurisdiction with sovereign claims for judging crimes against Jews-however correctly Arendt reads these claims as hindering the establishment of a cosmopolitan precedent on the basis of the Eichmann case-and to consider the actions and decisions by which its sovereignty among nations was established.
From its 1948 constitution as a Jewish state on military terms, contrary to the negotiated two-state partition provided for by United Nations Resolution 181, Israeli's sovereign identitarian interests were bound to take precedence over universalist rational interests codified in natural law. bermas recognizes that the relationship between a universalistic Kantian morality and positive law is complicated, with positive law not simply subordinate to moral law. His rational reconstruction of contractarian law, however, needs an epistemological notion of democracy as being a discussion leading to uncoerced, and thus valid, consensus on legal principles. "The democratic process," he writes, "bears the entire burden of legitimation."51 The problem with Habermas's attempt to reconstruct cosmopolitan law as neither derived from a Platonic higher truth nor empiricallyreducible to contingent legislative decisions is that the democratic process that would legitimate it has virtually no institutional presence in interstate or suprastate relations. Its presumptive emergence in the victory of parliamentary democracies over socialist dictatorships, as discussed in Habermas and also in Rawls's The Law of Peoples, is undermined by the substantive inequality between nations as either contracting people or discussing people.52 The Eichmann trial is so important here because its historical institutional setting and political circumstances embody a conflict that might otherwise be abstracted as a philosophical one between moral universalism and legal realism. With the Eichmann trial we see that the issue is not whether the idealist or realist narrative is emphasized as a matter of philosophical principle but that both are subordinate to the institutional advantages of those militarily enforced sovereignties who exercise jurisdiction. The enormity of the Holocaust crime does not give us a way out of a critical legal and moral historicism that questions the authority of its judges, enforcers, and chroniclers. The complex temporality of The Specialist's revaluation of received Holocaust values serves to foreground how so central an event of the century is never a sovereign truth with respect to its sedimentation in public discussions and representations. Such sovereignty-whether it is based on the force of state (and cultural) institutions or the a priori reason of universal laws-seeks to transcend the contingency of empirical will and perception. Sivan and Brauman, however, are concerned that the empiricism of openminded experience emerge again from behind the imposing grandeur of law and propaganda and serve as a yardstick, if not for normative values, then for actual behavior in the modern world. Whether or not we have laws and institutions capable of judging Eichmann from a secure spot beyond the contingency of power, we can certainly reflect upon this circumstance from the distance of spectatorship. The violence for which Eichmann bears guilt-in the judgment of the film, though certainly not that of the trialis not categorically distinct from the violence attributable to states that set themselves apart from fragile empiricism of daily life. In this sense, the film conveys a moral judgment based not on Kantian principles of disinterested rational autonomy-which are nowhere on display in the trial's confusion of interests and inclinations-but on the fact of human sentience. The virtue of this judgment, as opposed to legal judgments, is that it does not suggest a precedent or a program that can be appropriated by a judging authority. Here authority instead resides in a temporal suspension, a phenomenological epoche of cause and effect. The absence of any conceptually formulated lesson in the film-and its omission of the pronunciation of judgment and sentence on Eichmann-emphasize the similarity between the film's judgment, once removed from the trial's, and aesthetic judgment; without a conceptualization, our apprehension of Eichmann's guilt remains within Kant's famous formulation of the aesthetic as that "which is cognized without a concept," relying only in our a posteriori spectatorship and "the free lawfulness of the imagination."55 An aesthetic model of judgment was the last, uncompleted project of Arendt's career, and the film, though based upon an earlier Arendt work, conveys the sense of that model. It thus suggests in its revisioning of the trial neither a procedural model of justice nor a deontic model. It exposes the hollowness of any claims to the universality of the judgment and, hence, its conceptual portability by the state into different contexts. The justice the film documents, with its all too human contingency, appears as a positive judgment that might exemplify a righteous moment of kairos, but which has no broader prescriptive value. The presiding judge in the Eichmann case, Moshe Landau, has in fact gone on to rule in favor of the right of the Israeli security force, the Shin Bet, to torture Palestinians and to deplore later court decisions that try to elevate judicial authority over the legislative authority of the Knesset.56 In short, the historical record would seem to indicate that the judgment in the Eichmann case affirms only the immobility of justice beyond its positive determinations. Yet the model of aesthetic judgment the film evokes seems itself to be a risky model, though the risks it runs are of a different sort than those that the film exposes. By examining several implications of the film's critique of the trial and its precedent, I will conclude with a few thoughts about what I will argue is the virtue of a legal and aesthetic historicism that is narrower than universal schemes, but broader than individual perceptual intuitions.
From Evidence to
Given the number and importance of historical events that converged in the trial, the filmmakers' decision to distill Eichmann's testimony as the heart of the proceedings necessarily sidesteps the most important legacy of the Eichmann trial: not its missed opportunity to do moral good but its seized opportunity strategically to yoke morality and sovereignty rather than morality and law. While Arendt indeed argues that "the focus of every trial is upon the person of the defendant, a man of flesh and blood with an individual history, with an always unique set of qualities, peculiarities, behavior patterns, and circumstances" (EJ, p. 285) and even claims that "Eichmann's testimony in court turned out to be the most important evidence in the case" (EJ, p. 222), the actual trial did not limit its focus as Arendt thought it should, nor did the evidence matter centrally to a judgment whose verdict was never in doubt. One controversial aspect of Arendt's book is that she so strongly criticized what the trial was from the point of view of what for her it ought to have been: legally and democratically sensitive and utopian. The Specialist, by audiovisually rectifying the prosecution's decision to focus on "a great number of purposes... all of which were ulterior purposes with respect to the law" (EJ, p. 253) and returning Eichmann to center stage, is unable to address the historical significance of the way the trial in fact was conducted and its implications for hegemonizing public memory. "The show that Ben-Gurion had had in mind to begin with," Arendt claims, "did take place, or, rather, the 'lessons' he thought should be taught to Jews and Gentiles, to Israelis and Arabs, in short, to the whole world" (EJ, p. 9). While Sivan and Brauman refuse these lessons, their film restricts itself to a phenomenology of perception.
The empirical psychology revealed in The Specialist rests on the film's sharp focus on the person of the accused. This perceptual acuity has both an empirical side, which contributes greatly to the film's critique of the trial's false universalism, and a phenomenological side, which implies an anthropological universality of perception. The former aspect of the film lends it considerable contrarian potency in a historical moment where the international force of Holocaust discourse, blending moral, legal, and national claims, is out of all proportion to any public deliberation over who is entitled to the force of that discourse. The latter aspect, however, leads to a depoliticization at the point where the film might have indicated a reconsideration of the unequal distribution of moral authority through legal and aesthetic institutions of sovereignty. This ambiguous outcome can be clarified by examining its Arendtian model of spectatorship and exemplarity in judgment. For Arendt, the important fact of a judgment is not its abstract, categorical nature. Judgment works on the model of a paradigm supplied in apprehending a specific case. This paradigm, rather than categorical rea- 57. The issue of exemplarity that Arendt raises here can also be seen in the light of several more recent discussions. Hanssen writing on Walter Benjamin's "Critique of Violence" considers his "politics of noninstrumental means" a third force between law (which is a means to an end: justice) and sovereignty (Staatsgewaltas a means to legitimacy). In Hanssen's analysis, Benjamin's pure means avoids the thetic and normative force of locutionary concepts. In Arendt's sense, then, they are "exemplary"; free from instrumentality in the present, they are open toward the unprecedented future (Hanssen, Critique of Violence, p. 19).
One can see why Arendt's model of judgment would be appealing to filmmakers working in the public sphere of culture rather than in the narrow legislative realm. The emphasis on particularity allows for the sensual representational gaze of the camera, and the qualitativeness (quidditas) revealed by aesthetic discretion stands in favorable contrast to the relentlessly commensurate that is the object of judicial weighing and deciding.58 Habermas, however, points out a key limitation of using aesthetic perception as a model of judgment:
Mental representations ... are, in each case, my representations or your representations; they must be ascribed to a representing-either perceiving or imagining-subject who can be identified in space and time. Thoughts, on the other hand, overstep the boundaries of an individual consciousness. Even if in each case they are apprehended by a variety of subjects in various places and at various times, in the strict sense thoughts remain the same thoughts in regard to their content.59
Habermas's reservations about models of judgment based in perception or imagination indicate the importance to him of conceptual communication as the basis of validity. In this sense, Habermas's critique is relevant to understanding the limitations of Sivan and Brauman's film.
In a further sense, however, both the film and Habermas are open to the criticism with which I will conclude the essay, namely, the public reflection on justice (in the film) and the theory of public deliberation (in Habermas) emphasize, respectively, valid examples and valid rules, each containing normative force. By contrast, I would argue that it is essential to step beyond the specific mode of validity and account for the historical institutionalization of the validity claims. In this sense, I am not picking an epistemological fight with Habermas so much as I am doubting the excessive emphasis on the normative over the factual in his account of actually existing international law. I am likewise not contesting Sivan and Brauman's insight into the manipulative ease with which a judgment can be transmuted into a concept and thereby extended beyond the relevant boundaries 58. In her Kant lectures, Arendt accounts for the dialectic of quantity and quality involved in judgment by noting that the Kantian idea of dignity, central to his moral theory, demands that each individual be seen as an individual, without any comparison and principally incommensurable; meanwhile the Kantian doctrine of progress, focusing on the human species demands comparison and utility. "It is," she concludes her lecture, "against human dignity to believe in progress" (LK, p. 77). This observation is reminiscent of her earlier claim in the lectures that if Kant acted on his judgments he would be criminal. In other words, one might judge war as provident, but a trespass on dignity. Where, then, does this leave a theory of international law that might include things like jus ad bellum or in belli? 59. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p. 1o.
of moral righteousness and exploited for other means-transmuted, that is, from law into sovereignty. What I am doubting is whether their film's focus on the unique, singular, and qualitative aspects of Eichmann, the criminal and the human being, adequately grasps the need for comparison, juxtaposition, and discursiveness for a constructive politics-a counterhegemony-rather than an oppositional lament. Sivan and Brauman reshape a crucial Holocaust memory, but they do not analyze the context in which their project is received; they bid to reform memory without offering an archeology of how it has arrived at its current form. They thus run the risk of inserting utopia where they want to reveal the inescapability of some configuration of power in both our best and worst judgments. Moreover, as recent scholarship on the Holocaust film as a distinct genre has demonstrated, a shift in representation from victims to perpetrators (or, say, from a redemption narrative to a narrative of existential guilt or to a legal drama) does not simply depict another side of the Holocaust without further implication but comments unavoidably on established genre convention. Genre-bending films such as The Specialist or Errol Morris's documentary of the same year, Mr. Death, risk becoming invisible within the horizon of genre expectations rather than provoking a revision of convention. Morris joked wryly that his film "would be the first Holocaust-themed documentary not to be nominated for an Oscar," rightly assessing both it and the exclusionary rules of the genre.60 Cultural memory calls more strongly upon the same identitarian logic (or logic of identification, recognition, exemplarity) that underlies sovereignty than it does upon the discursive logic of natural law. In staking their opposition to received Holocaust memory as an artifact of specifically constituted and militarily dominating sovereignties on the ground of aesthetic judgment strictly conceived, Sivan and Brauman effectively counter the cliched sentiments of moral smugness such memory production affords the status quo. They do not, however, supply a ground on which to build an alternative discourse. That ground would indeed have to be more institutional, historical, and discursive in character.
In that spirit, I have suggested here a critique of international law based on a political account of how the Holocaust has been hegemonized by imperial sovereignty. The historical and political dimension ofjudgments and memories of fascism and Nazi genocide formed during the cold war has been widely effaced. Yet given the power of Holocaust "memories" in international life today, their ability to form a civic consensus where, say, Hiroshima or the Vietnam War cannot, demands that their exemplarity be 60. Quoted in Carl Bromely, "While the Academy Slept," The Nation, 2 Apr. 2001, p. 44. disrupted again by the old controversies they seemed to resolve and by the new ones they stifle. In 1949, as the Israeli parliament was still debating the "Law against Genocide and the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law," which later formed the legal basis for the Eichmann trial, a Knesset member made an observation that is even more apposite in a world with only one superpower to enforce all that falls under its sovereign jurisdiction: "The principal danger threatening the future of mankind, and of human culture, is the possibility that the precedent of Auschwitz will merge with the precedent of Hiroshima: if that happens, mankind is doomed" (quoted in SM, p. 333).
